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1. Marina NUNEZ (Departament de Matemàtica Econômica, Financera i
Actuarial and Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT), Universitat
de Barcelona, Spain)
Eractness, dual games and ertreme po'ints: the case of assi,gnment games
Several lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable
utility are considered, where the payoffs are computed following an externally given
order of the players. Some of these procedures make use of the dual coalitional values
instead of the ordinary coalitional values. The common feature of the methods
is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We
first investigate the general relationships between these allocations and obtain two
hierarchies on the class of balanced games.
Secondly, we focus on assignment games and sharpen some of these general rela-
tionships. Our main result is the coincidence of the sets of lemarals (vectors of
lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors),
lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and extreme core points.
As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational
payoff set, also the dual coalitionally rational payoff set of an assignment game is
determined by the individual and mixed-pair coalitions, and we present an efficient
and elementary way to compute these basic dual coalitional values. This provides a
way to compute the Al-value (the average of all lemacols) with no need to obtain
the whole coalitional function of the dual assignment game.
(joint work with Tamrâs Solymosi)
Contact: nnunez@ub. edu.
Paper available at http: I I econ. core.hu/ûle/downl oad I mtdp I MTDP 1 425. pdf.
2. Clemens PUPPE (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)
Towards a classifi,cation of Condorcet doma'ins
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the
preferences of all voters belong to this set, the majority relation has no cycles. We
observe that, without loss of generality, such domain can be assumed to be closed in
the sense that it contains the maiority relation of every profile with an odd number
of individuals whose preferences belong to this domain.
'We show that every closed Condorcet domain is naturally endowed with the struc-
ture of a median graph and that, conversely, every median graph is associated with
a closed Condorcet domain (which may not be a unique one). The subclass of
those Condorcet domains that correspond to linear graphs (chains) are exactly the
preference domains with the classical single crossing property. As a corollary, we
obtain that the domains with the so-called 'representative voter property' (with the
exception of a 4-cycle) are the single crossing domains.
Maximality of a Condorcet domain imposes additional restrictions on the underlying
median graph. We prove that among all trees only the chains can induce maximal
Condorcet domains, and we characterize the single crossing domains that in fact do
correspond to maximal Condorcet domains.
Finally, using Nehring's and Puppe's (2007) characterization of monotone Arrowian
aggregation, our analysis yields a rich class of strategy-proof social choice functions
on any closed Condorcet domain.
(joint work with Arkadii Slinko and Tobias Dittrich)
Contact: clenens. puppe@kit. edu.
Two papers available athttp:f f micro.econ.kit.edu/downloads/1507.08219v1.pdf and
http: f f micro.econ.kit.edu/downloads/Charact-SP.pdf.
3. Bruno TEHEUX (Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg)
Stron gly bary centri cally as s oci, atiu e an d preas s ociat'iu e functions
Let X be a nonempty set and X* be the free monoid generated by X (that is, X* is
the set of frnite words over X equipped with the concatenation operation). Recall
that a function F: X* -+ X U {e} is barycentrically associative if the function value
of a string does not change when replacing every letter of a substring of consecutive
letters with the value of this substring. This property is involved in Kolmogoroff-
Nagumo's characterization of quasi-arithmetic means.
In this talk, we investigate the stronger property of. strong barycentric associ,ati,uity
which says that the function value of a string does not change when replacing every
letter of any substring with the value of this substring. Equivalently, a function
F: X* -+ X U {e } is strongly barycentrically associative if and only if it satisfies
the equation
F(xvz) : F(F(xzll*l"F1xz;l"l;, xyz 
€ 
x*.
We also investigate a weaker version of strong barycentric associativity called strong
barycentri,c preassoc'iati,ui,ty which does not involve any composition of functions
in its definition. We establish links between strong barycentric associativity and
strong barycentric preassociativity. We recall a variant of Kolmogoroff-Nagumo's
characterization of the class of quasi-arithmetic means based on the strong barycen-
tric associativity property, and we provide an analog of this characterization that
involves strongly barycentrically preassociative functions.
fioint work with Jean-Luc Marichal)
Contact: br-uno. teheux@uni. lu.
4. trYancis BLOCH (University Paris I, Paris School of Economics)
C entrali,ty n'Leasurres'in netw orlcs
We show that although the prominent centrality measures in network analysis make
use of different information about nodes positions, they all process that information
in an identical way: they all spring from a common family that are characterized
by the same simple axioms. In particular, they are all based on a monotonic and
additively separable treatment of a statistic that captures a nodes position in the
network.
(joint work with Matthew Jackson et Pietro Tebaldi)
Contact: francis . bloch@univ-parisl . fr.
Encarnacion ALGABA (Department of Applied Mathematics and Re-
search Institute of Mathematics, University of Seville, Spain)
Cooperation on stractures wi,th commun'icati,on and hierarchi,cal features
The most common types of network structures that are applied in the literature
are represented by an undirected or directed graph. However, many economic and
social network structures cannot be described by such graphs. Although they can
be described by the more general hypergraphs, this last class may not capture some
essential features of certain network structures. Agents participating in different
kinds of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure'
Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new type of structure having both commu-
nication and hierarchical features. We describe a network by the feasible sets of
network positions (nodes). We compare these new network structures with other
structures from the literature, and study its basis, i.e. the 'smallest' representation
of the network. Finally, we apply these network structures to model cooperation
restrictions in cooperative games.
(joint work with Rene van den Brink and Chris Dietz)
Contact: ealgaba@us. es.
Sylvain gÉAL (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)
An ayiomati,zati,on of the i,terated h-inder and appli,cati,ons to sport ranlcing
A variant of the h-index introduced in Garcia-Pérez (2009), called the iterated h-
index, is studied to evaluate the productivity of scholars. It consists of successive
applications of the h-index so as to obtain a vector of h-indices. In particular' the
iterated h-index fixes a drawback of the h-index since it allows for (lexicographic)
comparisons of scholars with the same h-index. Two types or results are presented.
Firstly, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the iterated h-index, which
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rests on a new axiom of consistency and extensions of axioms in the literature to
a richer framework. Secondly, we apply the h-index and iterated h-index to offer
alternative sport rankings in tennis, football and basketball. These applications
clearly demonstrate that the iterated h-index is much more appropriate than the
classical h-inde.x.
(joint work with Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila, and Philippe Solal)
Contact: sylvain. beal@univ-fcomte . fr.
Miguel COUCEIRO (LORIA (CNRS - Inria Nancy Grand Est - Uni-
versité de Lorraine) and Michel GRABISCH (Université Paris I, Paris
School of Economics)
Integer-ualued rneans
Integer-valued meâns, satisfying the decomposability condition of
Kolmogoroff/Nagumo, are necessarily extremal, i.e., the mean value depends only
on the minimal and maximal inputs. To overcome this severe limitation, we pro-
pose an infinite family of (weak) integer means based on the symmetric maximum
and computation rules. For such means, their value depends not only on extremal
inputs, but also on 2nd, 3rd, etc., extremal values as needed. In particular, v/e shov/
that this family can be characterized by a weak version of decomposability.
Contact: miguel . couceiro@inria. f r, nichel . grabisch@univ-parisl . fr.
